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I hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, 
and that schools should be characterized rather by their logic 
than by their metaphysic.  
––Bertrand Russell, “Logical Atomism,” 1924 
  
 Introduction 
 Bertrand Russell initiated one of the formative battles of analytic philosophy at the 
turn of the 20th century with a wholesale assault on the headquarters of British monist 
philosophy: “the doctrine of internal relations.”1 In Russell’s words, the doctrine says that 
“the fact that two objects have a certain relation implies….something in the ‘natures’ of 
the two objects, in virtue of which they have the relation in question.”2 From this doctrine 
alone, he alleged, every other doctrine of metaphysical monism follows––thus did he 
sometimes call it “the axiom of internal relations”3––including the doctrine that there is 
one and only one really existing entity, the Absolute, and the corollary that any proposi-
tion about any entity is ultimately a proposition about the Absolute. Of course, what it 
means for relata to stand in relations ‘in virtue of their natures’ is not at all obvious; Rus-
sell understood it to mean that every relation is reducible, in some sense, to properties of 
relata. One of the most important consequences of this doctrine, so understood, is that 
relations do not really exist in themselves (hence are ‘internal’ to relata), such that the 
doctrine of internal relations is a variety of anti-realism about relations. An ‘external’ re-
lation, by contrast, is a relation which does exist in itself, and in which relata stand inde-
pendent of their ‘natures.’  
 In the main, Russell directed his criticisms against the monism of F.H. Bradley, 
probably the most influential of the so-called ‘British Hegelians,’ whose 1893 master-																																																								
1 Russell, “The Basis of Realism,” 160.  
2 Russell, “The Monistic Theory of Truth,” 160-1.  
3 Russell, “The Monistic Theory of Truth,” 160. 
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work Appearance and Reality was the impetus for Russell’s anti-monist crusade. Rus-
sell’s criticisms are also self-directed, since early in his philosophical career, he adhered 
to a Bradley-inspired form of monism. But there is more at stake in the dispute than 
whether or not relations exist, or whether or not there are many entities as opposed to just 
one. Russell believed that metaphysical doctrines are held on the basis of logical doc-
trines, and specifically on the basis of doctrines about logical form. Already before 
Gottlob Frege introduced the modern predicate calculus, Augustus De Morgan had ob-
served that Aristotelian term logic is not equipped for an adequate treatment of relational 
propositions and their implications.4 Russell argued that the source of the inadequacy is 
that the analysis of propositions into subject-predicate form is fundamentally mistaken, 
and reveals itself as such especially in the case of relational propositions. However, sub-
ject-predicate analysis, according to Russell, is not only logically inadequate, it is meta-
physically noxious, because the inadequacy of the subject-predicate form when applied to 
relational propositions leads the traditional logician to attempt a reduction of propositions 
about relations to propositions about monadic properties, such that relations themselves 
become superfluous. This may, Russell allows, work for some relational propositions, but 
when applied to propositions about ordering relations like ‘x is less than y’ or  ‘x is a part 
of y,’ the subject-predicate analysis fails to capture the asymmetry property. In the face of 
defeat, the monist’s only options are to admit to the irreducibility of external relations, or 
to commit to untenable metaphysical consequences. Russell’s insight, then, is that the 
																																																								
4 Tarski, “On the Calculus of Relations,” 73. Tarski refers to “[De Morgan’s] famous 
aphorism, that all the logic of Aristotle does not permit us, from the fact that a horse is an 
animal, to conclude that the head of a horse is the head of an animal,” and credits “his 
effort to break the bonds of traditional logic and to expand the limits of logical inquiry” 
by “his attention to the general concept of relations.”   
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metaphysical doctrine about relations one accepts depends on the logical analysis of rela-
tional propositions one accepts: the metaphysical dispute between monists and anti-
monists is really a dispute over the correct logical form of propositions, and propositional 
analysis is the correct method of resolving the metaphysical dispute.   
 I will argue, though, that Russell’s insight does not convey the full import of the dis-
agreement between Russell and Bradley, which originates not in the difference between 
two types of propositional analysis, but in a deeper methodological conflict over what 
logic is and how it can and should be applied in metaphysical reasoning. To that end, I 
will present four distinct logical methods of metaphysical reasoning, each employed by a 
distinct metaphysical philosopher. In part 1, I will lay out in detail the procedures of 
Bradley’s method, a dialectical approach to conceptual analysis that I call ‘intelligibility 
testing.’ In particular, I will examine Bradley’s method as applied to the concepts ‘ob-
ject,’ ‘property,’ and ‘relation’ to show that Bradley did not accept anything like the doc-
trine of internal relations in the form depicted by Russell. Moreover, I will show that in-
telligibility testing permits Bradley to reject the existence of both internal and external 
relations, and thereby show that Bradley reaches his anti-realism about relations on the 
basis of the intelligibility failure of the concept ‘relation,’ and not on the basis of a sub-
ject-predicate analysis of relational propositions.  
 In part 2, I will examine a critique of Russell’s logic by one of Bradley’s fellow-
travelers, Bernard Bosanquet, which will help characterize how the British monists un-
derstood the role of logic in metaphysics, and especially what logic needs to be capable 
of in order to occupy such a role. Bosanquet criticizes Russell’s formal system for its in-
sensitivity to propositional content, advancing two arguments: first, that the material con-
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ditional, which features prominently in the system, licenses ridiculous premises and con-
clusions in conditional reasoning, and second, that the axiomatization of mathematical 
theories in the system obscures distinctions in subject matter between distinct theories. 
Bosanquet prefers to think in terms of propositional systems that can be ranked according 
to their ‘logical stability.’ A propositional system is logically stable when it meets a pair 
of rationality conditions which make it eligible for metaphysical reasoning about some 
domain of actual content in the world. Bradley’s intelligibility tests can be incorporated 
into Bosanquet’s propositional systems to give a general picture of the British monist 
conception of logic and its application in metaphysics.  
 In part 3, I will present Russell’s arguments against the doctrine of internal relations, 
and demonstrate how and in what sense he thinks this doctrine follows from a subject-
predicate analysis of relational propositions. Then I will demonstrate how and in what 
sense Russell’s “doctrine of external relations,”5 which says that some relations are exter-
nal, follows from his own analysis of relational propositions, the ‘propositional function’ 
analysis. Additionally, it will become clear that Russell’s position on internal relations is 
not as far from Bradley’s as he would have us believe.    
 In part 4, I will show that Russell’s ally in the anti-monist struggle, G.E. Moore, who 
agreed with Russell about the existence of external relations, in fact only agreed with 
Russell in a superficial sense, because he defined the terms ‘internal’ and ‘external’ in a 
radically different way than Russell did. Moore provided a substantive critique of the 
metaphysical limitations of Russell’s logic; in particular, he claimed that the material 
conditional was incapable of properly formulating the doctrine of internal relations, and 
																																																								
5 Russell, “The Basis of Realism,” 160.  
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as an alternative introduced an ‘entailment’ connective into Russell’s system, which is 
logically indistinguishable from necessary implication. This lets the system express mo-
dal versions of the principles of the Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Identity of Indis-
cernibles, which Moore used to formulate the doctrine of internal relations such as to de-
fine ‘internal’ to mean ‘necessary’ and ‘external’ to mean ‘contingent.’ I point to some 
comments of Russell’s which indicate that he would not have agreed with Moore’s defi-
nitions, and also note that mathematical ordering relations, for Russell an exemplar of 
external relations, come out internal on Moore’s definition. Moreover, I look at some ar-
guments Russell made against modal formulations of the doctrine of internal relations 
and confirm Moore’s claim that material implication hampered Russell’s ability to argue 
effectively against these forms of the doctrine. In sum, Russell and Moore are neither ar-
guing against the same doctrine of internal relations, nor arguing for the same doctrine of 
external relations, and thus any agreement between them is essentially hollow.   
 Finally, I will conclude that Moore’s modal method is the right one for reasoning 
about internal and external relations, especially when outfitted with a ‘possible worlds’ 
interpretation. I offer a modal definition according to which ordering relations are exter-
nal, and which does not succumb to any of the difficulties that Russell identified. While 
this definition does not justify the doctrine of internal relations, it does, in my opinion, 
justify the concept ‘internal relation’ for the purpose of making informative statements 
about the ‘natures’ of entities. The focus on logical methods of metaphysical reasoning in 
this paper is meant to illustrate that the metaphysical disagreement over internal and ex-
ternal relations is, at root, a conflict in logical methodology, thereby generalizing Rus-
sell’s insight beyond the case of propositional analysis.  
	 6	
 1. Intelligibility Tests: Bradley 
 Bradley’s logical method in Appearance and Reality is to propose a formulation of 
some intuitive metaphysical concept which we apply in our everyday experience to un-
derstand reality, and then submit it to a test of its ‘intelligibility.’ The test procedure be-
gins with a conceptual formulation FC of a concept C, and FC passes the test so long as it 
does not lead to contradiction, circularity, regress, or nonsense (any logical deficiency 
will do). If FC fails, the following step is to test the intelligibility of its negation F*C, 
which passes or fails under the same conditions as FC. Since FC and F*C are mutually ex-
clusive, if FC passes, then F*C fails, and vice versa; however, the failure of one does not 
guarantee that the other passes. If either FC or F*C passes, then C passes, but if both FC 
and F*C fail, then C fails. If C fails, modify FC to an alternative formulation FʹC and start 
again. If C passes, it would, presumably, be permissible to use C in a metaphysical sys-
tem; it could, for instance, occur in the definitions of other concepts. The objective of an 
intelligibility test is to determine “how without error we may think of reality,”6 and even 
though Bradley admits that some erroneous concepts may be “necessary in practice,” 
they are nonetheless “theoretically unintelligible.”7 That is, we may not be able to get 
along in everyday experience without a concept C, but Bradley’s intelligibility test for C 
determines whether or not we are justified employing it in metaphysical reasoning.  
 Bradley begins by testing our most intuitive metaphysical concept, the ‘property-
bearing object.’ Since “[w]e find the world’s contents grouped into things and their quali-
ties,”8 we might naturally think of the property-bearing object O in one of two mutually 
																																																								
6 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 20.  
7 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 21.  
8 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 16.  
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exclusive ways: as just a set of properties (FO), or not just a set of properties (F*O). FO 
says that O is the set of properties jointly sufficient to constitute O; F*O says it is an addi-
tional unit to which the properties belong. Beginning with FO, Bradley observes that the 
object is not a set of properties “if you take them each severally,”9 since if we try to 
predicate a property of such an object, we either predicate a property of itself, or we 
predicate a property of another property, and “[w]e certainly do not predicate one of the 
other; for, if we attempt to identify them, they at once resist.”10 Take the object consti-
tuted by the properties P1 (black), P2 (white), and P3 (red). Predicating P1 of P1 is trivial 
(black is black); meanwhile, predicating P1 of P2 is false, since they are different proper-
ties (white is not black). However, if we try to predicate a property of the set of proper-
ties, then we either predicate that property of a set which already contains it, in which 
case we say nothing about the object––“if the predicate makes no difference, it is idle”11–
–or we add another property to the set, in which case we enlarge the object, but we say 
nothing about the object we started with. That is, predicating P1 of the set {P1, P2, P3} is 
either trivial, because it simply lists an element of the set (black is a member of {black, 
white, red}), or false, because P1 is a member of the set and is not identical with it (black 
is not {black, white, red}). And predicating a property P4 (read all over) of {P1, P2, P3} 
generates {P1, P2, P3}; P4 ({black, white, red, read all over}), in which case it predicates 
P4 of {P1, P2, P3, P4} and not of {P1, P2, P3}, the original object of predication. And then 
P4 has the problem P1 had: it is either trivially or falsely predicated of {P1, P2, P3, P4}.  
																																																								
9 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 16.  
10 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 17.  
11 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 17.   
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 Predication, then, seems to require an additional unit which we can predicate proper-
ties of, so that we are not just predicating properties of properties or of sets of properties. 
The intelligibility failure of FO transitions immediately to the test of F*O, a conceptual 
formulation positing something more than just a set of properties. But F*O fails as well, 
because “if….we inquire what there can be in the thing beside its several qualities, we are 
baffled once more.”12 We can identify no bare object without properties to serve as the 
additional unit, as without its properties an object is unidentifiable––thus “[w]e can dis-
cover no real unity existing outside these qualities, or, again, existing within them.”13 
Since both FO and F*O fail their intelligibility tests, O is unintelligible. The only way to 
preserve the concept of the ‘property-bearing object’ is to modify the formulation and 
continue the process of intelligibility testing, “to set [it] down as mere appearance”14 and 
search for conceptions which we can apply intelligibly to reality.   
 The modification FʹO says that an object O is a relation of properties which “co-exist 
in a certain way”15 so as to constitute O. The introduction of the concept ‘relation’ 
through modification is justified only if the concept passes its own intelligibility test––it 
must be legitimately introduced into the metaphysical system. There are, as before, two 
mutually exclusive conceptual formulations of ‘relation’: a relation R is either dependent 
on some property in virtue of which its relata stand in R (FR), or it is independent of its 
relata and they stand in a pre-existing R (F*R). In Russell’s terms, relations are either ‘in-
ternal’ or ‘external.’   
																																																								
12 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 16.  
13 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 16.   
14 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 21.  
15 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 16.  
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 Speaking of a relation R(a, b), Bradley puzzles over what it might mean to say that 
relata stand in a relation in virtue of some property they have: “if you mean that [a] and 
[b], taken each severally, even ‘have’ this relation, you are asserting what is false. But if 
you mean that [a] and [b] in such a relation are so related, you appear to mean nothing.”16 
In other words, if a and b each have a property in virtue of which they stand in R to each 
other, then a has that property and b has that property, so they stand in R independently 
of each other. And if a and b taken together have a property in virtue of which they stand 
in R to each other, that amounts to a and b having the property of standing in the relation 
R, which is the fact we are trying to understand in the first place. Take the relation ‘a 
dances with b.’ Presumably, a cannot dance with b, nor b with a, unless a and b dance 
together; but ‘a and b dance together’ is another way of expressing the relation ‘a dances 
with b,’ not a property in virtue of which they stand in that relation (or move around in 
that relation, as it were). Think of the two possible formulations of ‘internal’ as sub-
formulations of FR, so that FR passes its intelligibility test just in case one of its sub-
formulations passes. Then, because neither sub-formulation can meaningfully define 
what sort of property something has in virtue of which it stands in a relation, the formula-
tion FR fails its intelligibility test. This argument, whatever its merits, is Bradley’s ex-
plicit rejection of the concept ‘internal relation.’  
 It is in the process of testing F*R that Bradley first invokes his famous regress argu-
ment against the concept ‘external relation.’ I have tried to describe the procedures of 
Bradley’s intelligibility tests in part because I want to show that his argument against 
‘external’ relations does not imply an argument for ‘internal’ relations. Intelligibility tests 
																																																								
16 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 17.  
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allow Bradley to reject any conceptual formulation and its negation, since both are sub-
mitted to the same test and pass or fail under the same conditions. The tests can be con-
tinued through modification, so there is no need to settle in favor of a formulation or its 
negation; they are mutually exclusive but not mutually exhaustive.  
 The test of F*R assumes the negative result of the test of FR, that “the relation [R] has 
been admitted different from [a] and [b], and no longer is predicated of them.”17 Still, 
“[s]omething….seems to be said of this relation [R], and said, again, of [a] and [b]. And 
this something is not to be the ascription of one to the other.”18 Even though R is now in-
dependent of any property of a or b, and thus, according to Bradley, is not predicated of 
the relata, something is still said about the relation R and the relata a and b. Because no 
property is predicated of a or b, and because a and b are genuinely related by R, Bradley 
concludes that there “would appear to be another relation, [Rʹ], in which [R], on one side, 
and, on the other side, [a] and [b] stand.”19 What is said of R is that it relates a and b, and 
what is said of a and b is that they are related by R––so R stands in the relation of ‘relat-
ing’ (Rʹ) to a and b. This is the source of the regress: Rʹ likewise must stand in yet an-
other relation Rʹʹ to R and (a, b), and so on infinitely. F*R fails because the independently 
existing relation R is unable to relate a to b, as the relation R(a, b) presupposes Rʹ(R, (a, 
b)), and Rʹ(R, (a, b)) presupposes Rʹʹ(Rʹ, (R, (a, b))), &c. And given the failure of both FR 
and F*R, R is unintelligible.  
																																																								
17 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 18.  
18 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 18.  
19 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 18.  
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 But Bradley doesn’t dispense with the concept ‘relation’ immediately, concluding 
that “the problem….really turns on the respective natures of quality and relation.”20 
Given that, we might expect Bradley to run tests on two separate and self-sufficient con-
cepts, the concept ‘property’ and the concept ‘relation,’ respectively, but instead he wants 
to show that “[r]elation presupposes quality, and quality relation. Each can be something 
neither together with, nor apart from, the other.”21 A conceptual formulation FP for the 
concept ‘property’ (P) will say that “[q]ualities are nothing without relations,”22 that is, 
no property P exists without standing in some relation R. The test of FP is a test of the 
dependence of P on R, and the test of F*P, which says that P indeed may exist without 
standing in any relation R, is a test of the independence of P from R.  
 Start with FP, which says that a property P is dependent on some relation R, so that P 
would not exist if it did not stand in R. At this point, we might expect that Bradley is 
never going to let any conceptual formulation pass its intelligibility test, but here the 
strategy is a bit different: Bradley is going to argue that both FP and F*P pass their intel-
ligibility tests, so that the conceptual formulation of P and its negation both pass their 
intelligibility tests, resulting in the intelligibility failure of P. To show that FP passes, 
Bradley argues that because properties are different from each other, and because differ-
ence is a relation, the very existence of properties depends on their standing in the rela-
tion of difference to each other:  
 For consider, the qualities [F] and [G] are to be different from each other; and if  so, 
 that difference must fall somewhere. If it falls, in any degree or to any extent, outside 
 [F] or [G], we have relation at once. But, on the other hand, how can difference and 
 otherness fall inside? If we have in [F] any such otherness, then inside [F] we must 																																																								
20 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 21.  
21 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 21.  
22 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 21.  
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 distinguish its own quality and its otherness. And, if so, then the unsolved problem 
 breaks out inside each quality, and separates each into two qualities in relation.23  
 
Note, first, that if properties were not different from each other, then they could not dif-
ferentiate objects from each other––and consequently “all must fall into one.”24 It is be-
cause Bradley considers such a monistic consequence undesirable that he assumes that 
properties are different from each other, trivial though it is (we will see Russell accuse 
him of accepting precisely this monistic consequence). Assuming, then, that properties 
are different from each other, we can ask what differentiates them from each other: is it a 
relation of difference between properties, or a property of difference in the properties 
themselves? If the former, then difference is, of course, a relation, and FP passes; if the 
latter, then difference is a property different from the property it differentiates, so “the 
unsolved problem” returns: what differentiates the property of difference from the prop-
erty it differentiates? We are forced to conclude that what differentiates the property of 
difference from the property it differentiates is a relation of difference, so that FP passes. 
If difference is a relation, and properties are differentiated by standing in a relation of dif-
ference, then properties are dependent on relations, and FP passes; if difference is a prop-
erty, then properties have a property which differentiates them and stand in a relation of 
difference to that property, so again properties are dependent on relations, and FP passes; 
therefore, FP passes.  
 The fact that FP has passed, according to the intelligibility test procedure, guarantees 
the failure of F*P by default. We know that the failure of a conceptual formulation does 
not immediately result in its negation passing, because the failure of a concept lets us 
																																																								
23 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 24.  
24 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 25.  
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modify it in the hope that it will eventually pass and become usable in the system; a for-
mulation and its negation are not mutually exhaustive. But we also know that if a concep-
tual formulation passes, there is no need to test its negation, as the concept passes if one 
and only one formulation passes. So why test F*P at all? Notice that in a couple of the 
foregoing tests, specifically those of F*O and F*R, we assumed the negative results of the 
previous tests as premises. But since FP has passed, we have acquired a positive result, 
and therefore if we assume the positive result in a test of F*P and derive some logical de-
ficiency, F*P would pass––a reductio on F*P would be sufficient to show that F*P passes 
and, thus, that FP fails. But since we saw that FP passed its own test, and thus that F*P 
failed even prior to testing, FP and F*P will have each both passed and failed, resulting in 
the intelligibility failure of P.  
 Assuming, then, the positive result of the test of FP, that properties are dependent on 
relations, Bradley points out that this does not imply that properties are “resolved into the 
relations,”25 since relations presuppose relata––“relations must depend upon terms, just 
as much as terms upon relations.”26 We saw that the relation on which a property depends 
is its relation of difference to other properties, and in this it is like anything which is dif-
ferent from any other thing: different things depend on the relation of difference. Now, if 
a property P both depends on and is depended on by a relation, P splits into something a 
on which the relation depends and something aʹ which depends on that relation. P is no 
longer one thing, but two different things, and since two different things stand in the rela-
tion of difference, a and aʹ stand in the relation of difference to each other. What troubles 
																																																								
25 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 25.  
26 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 26.  
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Bradley is that “this diversity is fatal to the internal unity of each”27: if a and aʹ stand in 
the relation of difference to each other, then they are no better off than P. For instance, a 
is both something aʹʹ on which its relation of difference depends, and it is yet another dif-
ferent thing aʹʹʹ which depends on standing in that relation. Then, both aʹʹ and aʹʹʹ are 
subject to the same split, so they are “dissipated in an endless process of distinction.”28 
Because the property P splits into a and aʹ, and because a splits into aʹʹ and aʹʹʹ, and so on 
indefinitely, we have to conclude that the assumption that properties depend on relations 
involves us in another regress. Thus, by assuming the positive result of the test of FP, we 
assume the failure of F*P and thereby derive a regress, showing by reductio that the fail-
ure of F*P has absurd consequences, i.e., that F*P passes. So because FP and F*P are mu-
tually exclusive conceptual formulations of P, and because each passes its intelligibility 
test, P must be an unintelligible concept.  
 One might wonder in what sense Bradley’s method is a ‘logic.’ It is, undoubtedly, a 
procedure for evaluating conceptual formulations and their permissibility in systems of 
metaphysical reasoning, but such systems are unlike the formal systems in which modern 
logicians operate. What, exactly, is the difference?  
 
 2. Logical Stability: Bosanquet 
 One of Bradley’s contemporaries, Bernard Bosanquet, attempted to pinpoint the dif-
ference in his textbook Logic, or the Morphology of Knowledge. Between the publication 
of the first edition in 1888 and the second in 1911, Russell had published his Principles 
of Mathematics, as well as an article on type theory and the first volume of Principia 																																																								
27 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 27.  
28 Bradley, Appearance and Reality, 26. 	
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Mathematica (with Alfred North Whitehead). Bosanquet, apparently, felt compelled to 
respond to Russell’s work in an appendix to the second edition of his Logic called “On 
the Relation of Symbolic Logic to the Theory of the Present Work,” in which he counter-
poses Russell’s “Formal Logic, construed as including pure Mathematics” to his own 
“Philosophical Logic” in “the tradition….of Aristotle and Plato.”29 Though Bosanquet 
admits that he cannot pretend to challenge Russell’s formal logic on its own terms, he 
nonetheless advances a couple objections which help to characterize his own discomfort 
with “pure logical implication”30 detached from “an underlying real system.”31  
 His first objection concerns “Mr. Russell’s extreme use of the hypothetical proposi-
tion in illustrating the meaning of implications,”32 i.e., Russell’s definition of the condi-
tional as ‘material implication.’ Bosanquet is especially distraught by the validity of an 
implication like ‘If a donkey is Plato, he is a great philosopher,’ which in Russell’s analy-
sis becomes ‘for any x, if x is a donkey and x = Plato, then x is a great philosopher.’ If ‘x 
is a donkey’ is false when ‘x = Plato’ is true, the antecedent is a false conjunction guaran-
teeing the truth of the “hypothetical proposition,” which admits an “illegitimate hypothe-
sis”33 and thereby “scatters….underlying reality to the winds.”34  
 Bosanquet, of course, is far from the only logician in the history of philosophy to ex-
press reservations about material implication; e.g., the ‘paradoxes of material implica-
tion’ inspired the subsequent development of modal logic. But where that was an attempt 
to expand and reform symbolic logic to account for its alleged shortcomings, Bosanquet’s 																																																								
29 Bosanquet, Logic, 40.  
30 Bosanquet, Logic, 43.  
31 Bosanquet, Logic, 41.  
32 Bosanquet, Logic, 41n.   
33 Bosanquet, Logic, 44.  
34 Bosanquet, Logic, 41n.   
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“Philosophical Logic” is a radically different project which, as his first objection indi-
cates, intends to capture the ‘real’ content ‘underlying’ logical implications. Unlike for-
mal logic, which is occupied “not with facts, but with the mutual implications of proposi-
tions,”35 philosophical logic should be able to represent reasoning about metaphysical re-
ality and provide criteria for evaluating the ‘real systems’ in which such reasoning takes 
place. Because formal logic does not bother with the metaphysical content of its proposi-
tions, it can tolerate unrealistic assumptions and absurd conclusions.  
 Bosanquet’s second objection is directed against Russell’s view that “pure Mathe-
matics is to consist….in logical deductions from logical principles,”36 as again a system 
of reasoning which Bosanquet takes to be ‘about’ a particular class of actual entities has 
been replaced by a formal system which can be said to be ‘about’ whatever satisfies its 
abstract logical relations. Thus, “very great and serious differences between two sets of 
terms may be neglected (such as differences between points in a Euclidean plane and 
complex numbers) if only a common set of formal deductions can be found which apply 
to them.”37 This objection evokes historical anxieties about David Hilbert’s axiomatiza-
tion of Euclidean geometry, which interpreted the terms ‘point’ and ‘line’ to refer to 
whichever entities satisfy the axioms, and not, essentially, to points and lines. “[A]ctual 
space,”38 according to Bosanquet, is the “underlying reality” grounding any geometrical 
theorems and deductions––geometry is true because it is the theory of empirically real 
space. The formalization of pure implications, like the axiomatization of pure geometries, 
threatens to deprive logic and mathematics of their essential subject matters, and thus of 																																																								
35 Bosanquet, Logic, 42.  
36 Bosanquet, Logic, 43.  
37 Bosanquet, Logic, 43.  
38 Bosanquet, Logic, 42.  
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any metaphysical salience. Indeed, if Russell appreciated this point, he would not be able 
to reduce mathematics to logic, as their respective contents would resist conflation.   
 Philosophical logic, dissatisfied as it is with ‘pure implication,’ is instead “interested 
in the conditions of logical stability,” which Bosanquet defines as “that characteristic of a 
system of propositions which makes it free from self-contradiction and from contradic-
tion with the rest of experience.”39 A propositional system is not just a set of propositions 
in an implication relation, but must observe, ideally, the conditions of formal and empiri-
cal consistency: the propositions are consistent with each other and with any possible 
evidence. “Its degree of non-liability to contradiction, internal or external, is its degree of 
logical stability,”40 so that we can imagine a hierarchy of propositional systems, with 
those of the lowest degree of stability on the bottom and those of the highest degree on 
the top; the most logically stable system, even if only a regulative ideal, would be “the 
whole system of judgments which represents our organized experience.”41 If a proposi-
tion is introduced into the system which lowers its degree of stability, then an inference is 
justified on the grounds that it is “necessary to the avoidance of contradiction in the sys-
tem.”42 Implications between propositions only serve to balance them against each other 
such as to maintain or improve the overall stability of the system. Propositions do not 
even have truth-values independently of their role in balancing the system; truth-values 
are capable of degrees, as “a proposition could be more or less true because of being 
more or less supported by other propositions,” whereas in formal systems the truth-value 
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of a proposition is “a private affair of its own, not lying in its coherence or incoherence 
with a system.”43  
 Such remarks, at least considered outside their context in Bosanquet's wider project, 
are exceedingly vague, but the idea seems to be that one begins with extremely simple 
propositions about “minima of experience” or “isolated data,”44 such as observation re-
ports, and then, when one such proposition contradicts another––since they are just ob-
servation reports, formal and empirical consistency will amount to the same thing––the 
system is balanced out by propositions which restore consistency. A propositional system 
consisting only of observation reports will be highly unstable, because it is easy for em-
pirical observations to contradict each other: a system including the proposition ‘it is 
cold’ will become inconsistent upon the introduction of the proposition ‘it is warm,’ and 
this may lead to the introduction of propositions about, say, continuous changes in tem-
perature. Of course, this does not much resemble a typical ‘inference’ or ‘implication,’ 
but its purpose is to enable the construction of increasingly comprehensive systems by 
progressively smoothing out logical instabilities. It is rather more like certain kinds of 
‘defeasible’ implication, in which a proposition p defeasibly implies q just in case p of-
fers support for q (in some sense), even if q is not a logical consequence of p. And though 
Bosanquet’s logic has many of the standard features of a ‘coherence theory,’ the situation 
is complicated by the requirement of empirical adequacy. A propositional system at-
tempts to systematize our experiential data, so a formally consistent system which con-
flicts with empirical facts will still be ‘incoherent’ in the sense Bosanquet intends.    
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 I have sketched Bosanquet’s notion of ‘logical stability’ in the hope that it might 
serve as a context in which to understand Bradley’s intelligibility testing. Where Brad-
ley’s logic tests the intelligibility of concepts and hence their permissibility in conceptual 
systems, Bosanquet’s logic describes the conditions and degrees of logical stability for 
propositional systems, and how highly stable systems can be constructed from highly un-
stable systems. The objects of study are not, as Bosanquet stresses, formal proof systems, 
but metaphysical systems of the sort which a philosopher might construct, and the ration-
ality conditions on such systems. Bradley’s tests insure that the concepts a metaphysical 
system employs do not contradict themselves, and Bosanquet’s degrees of stability meas-
ure the overall tendency to contradiction in the system. If a formal logic is inconsistent, it 
loses value as an object of study, but for the ‘British Hegelians,’ perhaps unsurprisingly, 
contradiction has a generative function. When a contradiction is detected in a conceptual 
formulation, a modified formulation is proposed to account for it so that progress can be 
made in conceptual analysis; when a proposition is introduced into a system to reconcile 
a contradiction, the overall degree of stability increases. This ‘dialectical’ aspect of phi-
losophical logic is what makes it suitable for the study of metaphysical systems, the con-
sistency or stability of which cannot be assumed if their concepts and propositions are 
meant to apply to empirical reality. Philosophical logic deals in the content of concepts 
and propositions because it is their content which superimposes, or fails to superimpose, 
on the world itself. A coherent propositional system employing only intelligible concepts 
is appropriate for metaphysical reasoning in the way that a formal system of implications 
is not: if a logical system ignores content, it will be of no use in defining metaphysical 
concepts and evaluating metaphysical propositions.  
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 3. Propositional Analysis: Russell  
 Russell’s earliest discussion of internal and external relations occurs during his in-
vestigation, in the Principles of Mathematics, into ordering relations, especially “transi-
tive asymmetrical relations,”45 or strict orders like the less-than relation <. Addressing 
“the philosophic dislike of relations,” which induces philosophers to “hold that no rela-
tions can possess absolute and metaphysical validity,”46 he places the blame squarely on 
an antiquated subject-predicate analysis of propositions, which, when confronted by a 
relational proposition, attempts to reduce the relation to properties of the relata, such that 
the relation depends on the internal ‘natures’ of the relata and is not an independently 
existing entity external to them. Russell is, here as elsewhere, a bit elliptical when tracing 
the origins of this metaphysical view to subject-predicate logic, but the intuition of the 
subject-predicate logician seems to be that, assuming that to each subject corresponds a 
substance, and to each predicate a property inhering in a substance, a relation is anoma-
lous in that it seems to connect substances rather than inhere in them. So if a relational 
predicate is to correspond to something capable of inhering in a substance, a relation 
must be ontically dependent on properties of relata, not a medium existing in its own 
right.  
 There are, accordingly, two strategies of reducing relations to the properties of re-
lata, the first of which Russell calls ‘monadistic,’ the second ‘monistic.’ The monadistic 
reduction analyzes the relational proposition R(a, b) “into two propositions, which we 
may call ar1 and br2, which give to a and b respectively adjectives supposed to be to-
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gether equivalent to R.”47 In other words, a and b each receive their own predicate, r1 and 
r2 respectively, each corresponding to a property which, when taken together with the 
other, conditions the relation R between a and b.  The monistic reduction “regards the 
relation as a property of the whole composed of a and b, and as thus equivalent to a 
proposition which we may denote by (ab)r,”48 where r is predicated of both a and b taken 
together. If these two definitions of ‘internal’ sound familiar, it is because they very 
closely resemble the two sub-formulations of Bradley’s conceptual formulation FR, both 
of which Bradley rejects: the monadistic view on the grounds that reducing a relation to 
properties of the separate relata does not account for the fact that they are connected by  
the relation, and the monist view on the grounds that reducing a relation to a property of 
the relata taken together accounts only for the trivial fact that they are connected by the 
relation. So it might be something of a surprise when Russell attributes the monistic view 
to “Spinoza and Mr. Bradley”!49  
 Russell wants to show that an internalist reduction stumbles especially on the analy-
sis of asymmetrical relations. Plausibly, certain symmetrical relations are reducible to the 
properties of relata. Take the symmetrical relation ‘a differs in color from b,’ and say 
that a is green and b is yellow. The monadist reduces the relational proposition with a 
single relational predicate into two propositions with monadic predicates: ‘a(green)’ and 
‘b(yellow).’ The predicate ‘green,’ predicated of a, does not refer to b, and the predicate 
‘yellow,’ predicated of b, does not refer to a, so the predicate ‘differs in color’ does not 
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seem to correspond to anything which spans more than one substance, and the relation 
can be said to depend on properties of the individual relata.  
 However, when it comes to an asymmetrical relation, like ‘a < b,’ the relational 
predicate ‘<’ cannot be analyzed into ‘a(less than)’ and ‘b(not less than),’ as clearly the 
proposition says that a is not only less than something, it is less than b (and we also can-
not rule it out that b is less than something, if not a). So the proposition must resolve into 
the two propositions ‘a(less than b)’ and ‘b(not less than a),’ in which case the predicate 
‘less than b,’ predicated of a, refers to b, and the predicate ‘not less than a,’ predicated of 
b, refers to a. However, “if [a] has an adjective corresponding to the fact that it is [less 
than b], this adjective is logically subsequent to, and is merely derived from, the direct 
relation of [a] to [b],”50 so the allegedly monadic predicates are tacitly non-monadic, and 
cannot correspond to properties each predicated of only one relatum. Russell concludes 
that “the attempted analysis of the relation fails, and we are forced to admit what the the-
ory was designed to avoid, a so-called ‘external’ relation, i.e. one implying no complexity 
in either of the related terms.”51 When the monadist attempts to resolve an asymmetrical 
relational predicate into two monadic predicates, each predicated solely of an individual 
relatum, each predicate inevitably refers to the other relatum of which it is not predicated, 
thereby presupposing an irreducible asymmetrical relation.  
 The monistic reduction does not fare much better. ‘a < b’ reduces into a single 
proposition ‘ab(less than),’ but it may equally well reduce into the proposition ‘ba(less 
than),’ since the monist cannot presuppose the asymmetrical relation between a and b in 
the whole ab if he wants to reduce it to a property thereof. Moreover, the monistic reduc-																																																								
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tion should apply as well to the parthood relation on which it relies, and the proposition 
‘a is a part of b’ should reduce to a proposition about the whole composed of a and b, or 
‘ab(is a part of).’ But the parthood relation is itself asymmetrical, so we do not know if a 
is a part of b or if b is a part of a, as ‘ba(is a part of)’ is an equally good analysis if ab and 
ba are the same whole. If they are not the same whole, the monist presupposes the rela-
tion he is trying to reduce; if they are the same whole, the parthood relation becomes 
symmetrical, and in that case everything is a part of everything else, because if a is a part 
of b and b is a part of a, every part of a is a part of b and every part of b is a part of a, and 
likewise for whatever else a and b are parts of. If my arm is a part of my body, and my 
hand is a part of my arm, then my hand is a part of my body. But if my body is also a part 
of my arm, and if my leg is a part of my body, then my leg is also a part of my arm, and 
then I might as well have a foot in place of my hand. And if everything is a part of every-
thing else and thus a part of one big thing, so that there really are no parts and wholes, we 
are led to accept the especially pernicious consequence that “the only true whole, the Ab-
solute, has no parts at all.”52  
 Russell has thus teased out how metaphysical monism follows from a subject-
predicate analysis of relational propositions, or more broadly how assumptions about 
logical form have metaphysical consequences. Analyzing a relational proposition into 
subject-predicate form reduces a relational predicate to a monadic predicate which, ac-
cording to the monist, applies to a whole composed of the relata. The monistic analysis 
of mereological propositions reduces the diadic predicate ‘is a part of’ to a monadic 
predicate applied to a whole composed of the part and the whole, thus rendering the 
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parthood relation symmetrical and, as a metaphysical consequence, wholes and parts in-
distinguishable. The only whole there is, the whole composed of everything there is (‘the 
Absolute’), is partless––otherwise the symmetrical parthood relation would require that it 
was a part of its parts, in which case it would be one of the things there is and, thus, not 
the whole composed of everything there is. In reality, there are no things which are parts 
of the Absolute, which is, paradoxically, a partless whole, the one and only thing there is. 
The absurdity of monism, as Russell sees it, is a result of errors in the logical analysis of 
propositions; and if we want to avoid the conclusions that relations are unreal and that the 
Absolute is the only thing there is, we must abandon the subject-predicate analysis which 
yields them.  
 Similar arguments against internal relations, however, can be made in purely meta-
physical terms. For instance, Russell argues from metaphysical assumptions about objects 
and properties that relations cannot be ontically dependent on properties of relata, and 
must therefore exist independently, much as Bradley does. In fact, Russell recycles an 
argument of Bradley’s, the test of conceptual formulation FP, which says that properties 
are ontically dependent on relations, and which Russell takes as an argument in favor of 
external relations. Considering relations which “are reducible to internal states of the ap-
parently related objects,” Russell observes that “this class of relations presupposes a plu-
rality of objects, and hence involves the relation of diversity….before we can distinguish 
the internal states of [a] from those of [b], we must first distinguish [a] from [b]….i.e., 
[a] and [b] must be different, before they can have different states.”53 Bradley’s argument 
was meant to convey that there could not be multiple properties unless they were mutu-
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ally differentiated from each other by standing in the relation of difference, thus assuming 
the independent existence of at least one relation. Notably, Bradley thought the alterna-
tive was a vulgar monism in which no properties were different from each other, and ac-
cordingly no objects were differentiable from each other by their properties.  
 Russell appropriates this argument in what looks like an attempt to show that there 
are no internal relations whatsoever––any such relation presupposes different relata and 
hence cannot be reduced to different internal states thereof without presupposing the rela-
tion of difference. In his arguments against the subject-predicate analysis of relational 
propositions, he was only prepared to conclude that some relations (e.g. asymmetrical 
relations) must be external, whereas others (e.g. symmetrical relations) might be amena-
ble to internalist reduction. In this case, he concludes that admitting the existence of any 
internal relations is metaphysically undesirable, since in order to avoid presupposing the 
external relation of difference, one must appeal to “the notion that the apparent relations 
of two things consist in the internal states of one thing,” namely the Absolute, a return to 
“rigid monism.”54 Russell, for his part, does not mention Bradley’s argument in connec-
tion with his own, though it seems obvious that he would have encountered it first in Ap-
pearance and Reality.  
 There are a couple important differences between the arguments, one minor and one 
major. The minor difference is that, in Russell’s argument, the relation of difference ob-
tains between different relata in order that it may obtain between their internal states; in 
Bradley’s argument, it is the converse, as the relation of difference obtains between dif-
ferent properties of relata in order that it may obtain between the relata. The major dif-
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ference is one of logical method, and is deeper than any difference of logical formalism: 
Russell is more or less correct that Bradley does not accept the existence of relations and 
is, ultimately, a metaphysical monist, but the subject-predicate diagnosis does not accu-
rately trace the origins of Bradley’s position, because it neglects how Bradley’s dialecti-
cal method of intelligibility testing leads him there. Bradley does not so much reject the 
existence of relations as reject the intelligibility of the concept of ‘relation,’ and so con-
cludes that the application of the concept to empirical reality is unjustified. Neither the 
‘internal’ nor the ‘external’ formulations of the concept pass their intelligibility tests, so 
there is no reason to accept relations in either form. Russell does remark that an internal-
ist view of relations “is, in fact, a theory that there are no relations,” as “has been recog-
nized by the most logical adherents of the dogma––e.g. Spinoza and Mr. Bradley––who 
have asserted that there is only one thing, God or the Absolute, and only one type of 
proposition, namely that ascribing predicates to the Absolute.”55 But he provides no com-
pelling argument to the effect that Bradley accepts these conclusions on the grounds that 
relations are reducible to properties of relata, a view which Bradley evidently does not 
endorse. While I agree with Russell that metaphysical doctrines boil down to matters of 
logic, he seems to misstep when he derives Bradley’s monism from erroneous assump-
tions about logical form. My contention is, rather, that Bradley’s monism is a conse-
quence of his logical method, and that the divergence in logical method between Russell 
and Bradley, as partly described by Bosanquet, is at the root of their disagreement over 
the metaphysics of relations, more so than any dispute over the correct logical analysis of 
propositions.  
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 In his later essays “The Monistic Theory of Truth,” from 1906/7, and “The Basis of 
Realism,” from 1911, Russell begins to defend what he calls “the doctrine of external re-
lations,”56 the core of a ‘pluralist’ metaphysics compatible with his own analysis of rela-
tional propositions. “The doctrine may be expressed by saying that 1) relatedness does 
not imply any corresponding complexity in the relata; 2) any given entity is a constituent 
of many different complexes.”57 In saying that a relation does not ‘imply complexity’ in 
the relata, Russell means that relata stand in relations irrespective of any non-relational 
facts about their internal structure, contrary to what “the axiom of internal relations”58 
would require. If we were to accept that axiom, along with a pair of plausible metaphysi-
cal premises––i). that there are infinitely many entities, and ii). that every entity stands in 
some relation or other to every other entity––then every relatum “would have to be 
strictly infinitely complex.”59 If we think of an entity, as before, as one part of the whole 
of everything that exists, then “each part will have a nature which exhibits its relation to 
every other part and to the whole,”60 thus reflecting the entire system of the universe 
within itself, “like….Leibniz’s monads.”61 An entity a standing in a relation R to b will 
bear a tacitly non-monadic property which in a literal sense ‘contains’ b, and a will thus 
bear a non-relational, though tacitly non-monadic, property corresponding to each rela-
tion in which it stands and containing each relatum to which it relates. And because a 
stands in some relation or other to every entity in the universe, a will be a container for 
everything else. Any proposition we assert about a will at the same time be a proposition 																																																								
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about every entity contained in a, and as such “would involve referring to everything else 
in the universe.”62 So the proposition R(a, b) refers not only to a and b, but also to every-
thing contained in a and everything contained in b. In that case, how do we know that the 
proposition is really about a and b and not about any of the infinitely many entities con-
tained in a and b? We might as well be asserting that R(c, d), since if a contains every-
thing, it contains c, and if b contains everything, it contains d, in which case the assertion 
that R(a, b) is an assertion about c and d as much as a and b. Indeed, since a and b each 
contain everything, we might as well be asserting that everything stands in R to every-
thing, so that the proposition R(a, b) is really a proposition about the relation of the Abso-
lute to itself. “Thus,” Russell says, “nothing quite true can be said about [a] without tak-
ing account of the whole universe, and then what is said about [a] will be the same as 
what would be said about anything else, since the natures of different things must….all 
express the same system of relations.”63 However, it seems clear that when we assert that 
R(a, b), we assert only that a stands in R to b: we refer only to a and b and we assert only 
that they stand in R to each other. Thus does the axiom of internal relations inflate the 
content of any proposition well beyond what it actually asserts, conflating every entity 
with every other entity, and thus any proposition about any entity with a proposition 
about every entity, so that whenever we seem to be making an assertion about something 
in particular, we are in fact making an assertion about everything in general. Monadism 
and monism, then, follow compatibly from the axiom of internal relations, as the infinite 
complexity of each relatum opens the backdoor to the Absolute.  
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 Just as the axiom of internal relations is the metaphysical complement of the subject-
predicate analysis of relational propositions, the doctrine of external relations comple-
ments Russell’s ‘propositional function’ analysis. A propositional function φ(x1,….xn) 
takes an n-tuple of entities a1,….an as an argument and outputs either a true or false 
proposition depending on whether a1,….an stand in the relation φ or not. So the true 
proposition <(7, 9) is the output of the propositional function <(x, y) when it takes the 
ordered pair (7, 9) as an argument, and the false proposition <(3062, 9) is the output 
when it takes (3062, 9) as an argument. When ‘7 < 9’ is analyzed such that ‘7’ is the sub-
ject which ‘less-than-9’ is predicated of, the predicate ‘less-than-9’ corresponds to a 
property inhering in the substance corresponding to the subject ‘7,’ and then 7 and 9 be-
come metaphysically inextricable, the one contained in the other.  
 But if, on the other hand, we analyze the relational proposition <(7, 9) into the pro-
positional function <(x, y) and the ordered pair (7, 9), we end up with two distinct con-
stituents: a relation detached from any relata in particular and a set of entities detached 
from any relation in particular. The propositional function corresponds to a relation ex-
ternal from its relata and therefore metaphysically real in itself, and the ordered pair to a 
set of self-sufficient entities which enter into relations without conceding their self-
identity; when combined, the propositional function and the ordered pair form a relational 
proposition, which corresponds to an external relation between independent relata. Ar-
guments and functions, unlike the substances and properties corresponding to subjects 
and predicates, are detachable, so that relations and relata maintain their metaphysical 
independence. 7 can be the argument for x in the propositional function <(x, y) while any 
other number is the argument for y, or vice versa, so that any number whatever is inter-
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changeable in either argument place in the function: the same 7 is a constituent of 7 < 9 
as of 7 < 3062 or of 2 < 7, and as such is a constituent of infinitely many relational 
propositions without itself containing infinitely many numbers.  
 
 4. Modal Entailment: Moore  
 Russell’s friend and colleague G.E. Moore made a late contribution to the debate 
with his 1919 paper “External and Internal Relations,” in which he agrees with Russell 
that not all relations are internal, but does so under a very different interpretation of the 
meaning of ‘internal.’ To begin with, Moore thinks that what he calls “the dogma of in-
ternal relations”64––refusing to dignify it as an axiom––is not really about relations per 
se, but about ‘relational properties.’ A relational property is the property of standing in a 
relation to something, so that if a stands in the relation R to b, a bears the relational prop-
erty of standing-in-R-to-b. Moore does not entirely justify the distinction, except to say 
that it helps us clarify that, according to the dogma of internal relations, if a stands in R to 
b, it is not just standing in R which is internal to a, it is standing in R to b. Moore does not 
consider the possibility of which Russell made so much, that such properties might be 
tacitly non-monadic and hence ‘imply complexity’ in the relata; relational properties are, 
on Moore’s view, perfectly straightforward and metaphysically unproblematic.  
 Speaking in terms of this distinction, Moore claims that “one thing which is always 
implied by the dogma….is that, in the case of every relational property, it can always be 
truly asserted of any term x which has that property, that any term which had not had it 
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would necessarily be different from x.”65 This modal interpretation of the dogma of inter-
nal relations, or at least of an important consequence of the dogma, is ambiguous between 
two readings: i). it is necessary that for any x and any y, if x bears the relational property 
φ, then if y = x, then y bears φ; or ii). for any x and any y, if x bears the relational property 
φ, then it is necessary that if y = x, then y bears φ. In other words, i). says that necessarily 
if anything bears a relational property, then it bears that relational property, and ii). says 
that if anything bears a relational property, then it necessarily bears that relational prop-
erty. Moore thinks that i). is obviously true of all relational properties, since it is a conse-
quence of the logical necessity of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that iden-
tical entities bear all the same properties. On the other hand, though ii). might be true of 
some relational properties, it would be absurd to think that it was true of all relational 
properties, since that would amount to the view that all relations are necessary, which is 
obviously false. If the dogma of internal relations amounts to the view that i). is true of 
all relational properties, then it is a weak and uncontroversial dogma; but Moore main-
tains that those who adhere to the dogma adhere to the strong and controversial dogma 
that ii). is true of all relational properties. On this reading, what it means to say that a re-
lational property is ‘internal’ is that it is a necessary relational property.  
 Moore observes that Russell’s logic––and specifically the connective ‘⊃’, interpreted 
as material implication––cannot represent the distinction between i). and ii). Russell’s 
system can express the relevant consequence of the Indiscernibility of Identicals: in con-
temporary notation, ‘∀x∀y(φx ⊃ (y = x ⊃ φy))’. This only says that it is actually the case 
that if anything bears the relational property φ, it is not the case that anything identical to 
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it fails to bear φ; but it says nothing about what is necessarily the case. Thus neither i). 
nor ii). can be represented in Russell’s system, and to improve its expressive power, 
Moore introduces the entailment connective ‘ent’. Now i). can be represented as 
‘∀x∀y(φx ent (y = x ⊃ φy))’, and ii). as ‘∀x∀y(φx ⊃ (y = x ent φy))’. But how should we 
understand ‘ent’? Moore makes the intriguing comment that “undoubtedly what Professor 
Lewis means by ‘[p] strictly implies [q]’ is what I mean by [p] ent [q],”66 i.e., Moore’s 
‘entailment’ corresponds to C.I. Lewis’ ‘strict implication,’ or, in contemporary terms, to 
‘necessary implication.’ This is perhaps unsurprising, since the distinction between the 
two readings depends on the scope of the modal operator ‘it is necessary that.’ In con-
temporary notation, we can use the box operator ‘¨’ for logical necessity to represent i). 
as ‘∀x∀y¨(φx ⊃ (y = x ⊃ φy))’ and ii). as ‘∀x∀y(φx ⊃ ¨(y = x ⊃ φy))’. The necessity 
operator has wide scope in i)., so that the implication on the left is a necessary implica-
tion, and narrow scope in ii)., so that the implication on the right is a necessary implica-
tion. If ii). is true for all relational properties, then the fact that something bears a rela-
tional property necessarily implies that it bears that property, in which case it bears all of 
its relational properties necessarily, and therefore every relation in which it stands is an 
internal relation. Moore, on the other hand, holds that if ii). is true for any relational 
properties, it is probably only true for some of them, in which case some entities bear 
some relational properties only contingently, and therefore some relations in which they 
stand are external relations. Though Russell too holds this position, his logic does not 
have the formal resources to express it, and must be able to incorporate necessary impli-
cation––whether in the form of Moore’s entailment connective, Lewis’ strict implication 
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connective, or the box operator for logical necessity––if it is to do any serious metaphysi-
cal reasoning about internal and external relations.  
 Russell never addressed Moore’s interpretation directly, but he did reject the follow-
ing modal argument for the axiom of internal relations: “if two terms have a certain rela-
tion, they cannot but have it, and if they did not have it they would be different; which 
seems to show that there is something in the terms themselves which leads to their being 
related as they are.”67 It is significant that Russell understands this as an argument for the 
axiom, and not as a formulation of it: on the assumption that entities which stand in a re-
lation to each other would not be those entities if they did not stand in that relation, we 
can conclude that there must be something in their ‘natures’ in virtue of which they stand 
in that relation. Unfortunately, Russell does not understand this argument modally at all, 
and hence his counter-arguments lack the force of Moore’s.  
 Russell entertains two non-modal readings of the argument. The first takes “if they 
did not have it they would be different” to mean that “if they were not so related they 
would be other than they are,” to which Russell objects that “if two terms are related in a 
certain way, it follows that, if they were not so related, every imaginable consequence 
would ensue.”68 In other words, if a and b stand in the relation R, then if they do not stand 
in the relation R, we have a contradiction, and from a contradiction anything follows. Of 
course, Russell reads “if they were not so related they would be other than they are” as a 
material rather than a counterfactual conditional, in which case Russell’s objection is le-
gitimate, but it is unlikely that anyone arguing for the axiom of internal relations would 
assent to that reading. Because Russell mistakes the counterfactual assumption that a and 																																																								
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b do not stand in R for a merely false assumption, the conclusions he draws are irrelevant 
to the modal argument for the axiom, illustrating yet another disadvantage of material 
implication in metaphysical reasoning.  
 In any case, Russell considers another reading of “if they did not have it they would 
be different” which takes it to mean that “if [a] and [b] are related in a certain way, then 
anything not so related must be other than [a] and [b],”69 a simple consequence of the 
non-modal form of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Nonetheless, Russell claims that it 
“only proves that what is not related as [a] and [b] are must be numerically diverse from 
[a] or [b]; it will not prove difference of adjectives, unless we assume the axiom of inter-
nal relations.”70 The Indiscernibility of Identicals implies that, if a and b stand in R to 
each other, then anything x and y which do not stand in R to each other are non-identical 
with a and b. But it does not imply that x and y, respectively, fail to bear any of the non-
relational properties of a and b, i.e., the Indiscernibility of Identicals does not imply the 
Discernibility of Non-Identicals, the contrapositive of the principle of the Identity of In-
discernibles, which says that entities which bear all the same properties are identical. The 
axiom of internal relations, which holds that every relation is reducible to non-relational 
properties of relata, requires the reduction of R to some non-relational properties of a or 
b, but if x ≠ a and y ≠ b does not imply that x and y fail to bear any of those non-relational 
properties, then we have not shown that some non-relational properties of a or b are those 
properties in virtue of which they stand in R, since x and y may well bear those properties 
without standing in R. If we were to assume the axiom of internal relations, then we could 
immediately conclude that x and y, respectively, do not bear any of the non-relational 																																																								
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properties of a and b, since they do not stand in R and, according to the axiom, to stand in 
R is to bear the requisite non-relational properties. But clearly the intention was to argue 
for the axiom without assuming it. Russell’s counter-argument, then, depends on the 
claim that the Indiscernibility of Identicals does not imply the Identity of Indiscernibles, 
and thus on the possibility that some entities are non-identical yet indiscernible. A ver-
sion of Leibniz’ Law, however, states that the two principles imply each other, and Rus-
sell offers nothing in the way of a refutation. Metaphysical tradition does nothing to dis-
suade Moore, either, from announcing that “it is obvious that the principle of Identity of 
Indiscernibles is not true,”71 without further justification. Dogmatism aside, both philoso-
phers at least recognize that these principles can help clarify the problem.  
 Moore’s innovation in this regard is to employ a modal form of the principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals to reason about the ‘natures’ of relata. Because that princi-
ple, in its non-modal form, expresses a logical relation between property-bearing and 
identity, it is particularly suitable for reasoning about the ‘natures’ of entities, if by the 
‘nature’ of an entity we mean that which distinguishes it from other entities. But by em-
ploying its modal form, which states that the principle is logically necessary, Moore 
broadens the meaning of ‘nature’ from how an entity is to how it must be, insofar as it 
exists. Given the logical necessity of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the relevant conse-
quence for the metaphysics of relations is that, necessarily, if anything bears a certain re-
lational property, then anything identical to it bears that property; and it is a confusion 
about the scope of ‘necessarily’ which leads to the dogma of internal relations, since it is 
plainly false that the fact that something bears a relational property implies that it must 
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bear it. The distinction between the modal and non-modal forms of the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals is essential to Moore’s point: though it is true that anything which happens to 
bear a relational property will, as a necessary condition of its self-identity, bear that prop-
erty, it is not true that anything which happens to bear a relational property will, as a nec-
essary feature of its self-identity, bear that property.  
 Russell was generally skeptical that we could reason about the ‘natures’ of entities at 
all. Throughout his discussion of internal relations, he assumes that for relata to stand in 
a relation in virtue of their ‘natures’ means that the relation is reducible to non-relational 
properties of the relata, which identifies the ‘nature’ of an entity with the set of its prop-
erties. But Russell was explicitly opposed to this conception of ‘nature,’ since it would 
allow “[a]ny casual collection of [properties]….to compose an [entity], if [entities] are 
not other than the system of their own [properties].”72 Moore, however, is comfortable 
enough with this conception to declare that “by a term’s nature is meant….all its [proper-
ties] as distinguished from its relational properties,”73 or the set of its non-relational prop-
erties. This conception of ‘nature’ figures in a formulation of the dogma of internal rela-
tions which might be more agreeable to Russell: “if you take all the [non-relational prop-
erties] which [a] term has, it will again follow in the case of each relational property, 
from the proposition that the term has all those [non-relational properties], that it has the 
relational property in question.”74 If the ‘nature’ of the entity a is the set of non-relational 
properties θ, and if a bears the relational property φ, then the proposition that a bears θ 
necessarily implies that a bears φ.  
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 In Russell’s view, what it means for a relation to be ‘reducible to’ non-relational 
properties, or for relata to stand in a relation ‘in virtue of’ their non-relational properties, 
is that any relational proposition, when properly analyzed, is equivalent to a non-
relational proposition in which only monadic predicates occur. Moore’s modal method of 
reasoning about relations, however, works within a logical system, at a level ‘above’ pro-
positional analysis. His notion of ‘entailment,’ or necessary implication, is capable of 
giving a much more precise meaning to ‘in virtue of,’ such that an entity bears a rela-
tional property in virtue of its non-relational properties just in case it bears that relational 
property, necessarily, whenever it bears those non-relational properties. We might better 
identify the ‘nature’ of the entity a with the set of its necessary non-relational properties 
θ, and then we can easily see that, if a bears θ, and if a bears θ necessarily implies that a 
bears the relational property φ, then φ is a necessary relational property of a. The dogma 
of internal relations then goes: every relational property of a relatum is necessarily im-
plied by the set of its necessary non-relational properties, i.e., is a necessary relational 
property. This, Moore thinks, is patently unacceptable, so he and Russell agree that there 
must be some external relations.   
 Unfortunately, they seem to disagree over the definitions of ‘internal’ and ‘external.’ 
Speaking of his doctrine of external relations, Russell cryptically remarks that it “is not 
correctly expressed by saying that two terms which have a certain relation might not have 
had that relation. Such a statement introduces the notion of possibility and thus raises ir-
relevant difficulties.”75 Russell does not elaborate on what these difficulties might be, or 
why they are irrelevant, but remember that Russell’s paradigm case of an external rela-
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tion is a transitive asymmetrical relation like <. The relation 7 < 9 is external to 7 because 
it does not confer any tacitly non-monadic properties on 7 such that 7 becomes a con-
tainer for infinitely many numbers; 7 stands in the less-than relation to infinitely many 
numbers irrespective of any non-relational facts about its ‘nature,’ and the less-than rela-
tion is external to any of the numbers which stand in it. However, 7 < 9 is a necessary 
relation, as all mathematical relations are, such that 7 bears the necessary relational prop-
erty less-than-9, which is thus, on Moore’s account, internal to 7. Russell may have rec-
ognized that an external relation is not necessarily a contingent relation, and that an inter-
nal relation is not necessarily a necessary relation, and sought on such grounds to pre-
clude any modal interpretation of the axiom of internal relations. Whatever his reasons, if 
he and Moore are not on the same page with respect to the examples of internal and ex-
ternal relations, then we should not expect them to be on the same page with respect to 
the definitions of ‘internal’ and ‘external.’  
 Russell demonstrated, to his satisfaction, that the axiom of internal relations is con-
sistent with a subject-predicate analysis of relational propositions, and that the doctrine of 
external relations is consistent with a function-argument analysis; ‘internal’ and ‘exter-
nal’ were defined in terms of the reducibility or irreducibility of relational predicates. 
Methodologically speaking, Russell thought that, so long as we get the analysis of propo-
sitions right, metaphysics will sort itself out: correct (incorrect) metaphysical doctrines 
are derived from correct (incorrect) propositional analyses, and a proper understanding of 
logical form will resolve our metaphysical quandaries. Moore, instead, meets Bosan-
quet’s challenge head on, enriching Russell’s logic such as to make it capable of robust 
metaphysical reasoning; the definitions of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ follow from proposi-
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tions in the expanded system. Because he builds on Russell’s system, Moore must as-
sume a propositional function analysis, but that does not, on its own, dictate which meta-
physical doctrines he must accept. Once again, it seems that Russell has overestimated 
what one can conclude on the basis of propositional analysis alone, as when he charged 
Bradley with a vulgar monism based on subject-predicate analysis, though Bradley’s mo-
nism in fact derives from the inapplicability of any metaphysical concept to empirical 
reality, a result which Bradley obtains through his dialectical method of intelligibility 
testing. All this to say that when Moore agrees with Russell’s doctrine of external rela-
tions, he does so according to a definition of ‘external’ with which Russell would not 
have agreed, and which he derives from propositions expressed in a formal system, not 
from the form of expression itself. The agreement between Russell and Moore, then, is 
largely superficial, since there is a deeper disagreement over the definitions of ‘internal’ 
and ‘external,’ itself due to a methodological conflict over the metaphysical implications 
of logic, over which aspects of logic have metaphysical implications, and over which 
logical methods are adequate and appropriate for metaphysical reasoning.  
 
 Conclusion 
 If Moore is right that an internal relation is just a necessary relation and an external 
relation is just a contingent relation, and that not every relation is necessary and some re-
lations are contingent, then it might be reasonable to dismiss the categories ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ from the metaphysics of relations altogether. Especially given subsequent de-
velopments in modal metaphysics, we seem to have a fairly clear notion of what it is for a 
relation to be necessary and what it is for a relation to be contingent: a relation R(a, b) is 
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necessary if and only if a stands in R to b in every possible world in which a and b exist, 
and R(a, b) is contingent if and only if a does not stand in R to b in every possible world 
in which a and b exist. Applying this language to Moore’s definition of ‘internal,’ we can 
say that, if θ is the set of non-relational properties which a bears in every possible world 
in which it exists, then a relational property φ is internal to a if and only if a bears φ in 
every possible world in which a bears θ. In that case φ is a necessary relational property 
of a, because a bears φ in every possible world in which a exists.   
 This ‘possible worlds’ interpretation of modal concepts has become standard in 
metaphysical reasoning about the ‘natures’ of entities, where an entity is said to bear a 
property ‘by nature’ just in case it bears that property in every possible world in which it 
exists. It is tricky to say, though, what it means for an n-tuple to stand in a relation ‘by 
nature,’ because what is the ‘nature’ of an n-tuple? Here we can see the advantage that 
Moore gains by referring to ‘relational properties,’ as it allows him to reason about the 
‘natures’ of the respective relata, rather than about the ‘nature’ of an ordered set, what-
ever that might be. In the foregoing, when we said that a relation is ‘internal’ or ‘exter-
nal,’ we meant either that it is internal or external to an individual relatum (the ‘monadis-
tic’ definition), or that it is internal or external to an n-tuple of relata (the ‘monistic’ defi-
nition). But a relation is necessary or contingent only to an n-tuple of relata, while a rela-
tional property is necessary or contingent only to an individual relatum, since it is, if we 
are to believe Moore over Russell, a monadic property. This, however, seems to put 
Moore at something of a disadvantage as well, because he can neither say of a relation 
that it is internal or external to an individual relatum, nor of a relational property that it is 
internal or external to an n-tuple of relata, and this puts talk of relations and relational 
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properties at cross-purposes when it comes to distinguishing ‘monadistic’ from ‘monistic’ 
definitions. In any case, this is another aspect of the issue on which Moore and Russell do 
not confront each other directly, and I will continue to speak in terms of relations and not 
relational properties.  
 Nevertheless, we might sensibly conclude that, because the concepts ‘internal rela-
tion’ and ‘external relation’ are, even after dozens of pages of exposition, still hopelessly 
ambiguous, we should expend with them entirely, and stick to the much more intelligible 
concepts ‘necessary relation’ and ‘contingent relation,’ spelled out in terms of possible 
worlds. Russell, furthermore, seems to have demonstrated that there is no sense in trying 
to reduce relational propositions to non-relational propositions: one always ends up pre-
supposing the relations one is trying to eliminate. Finally, the monists themselves, upon 
close inspection of their logical methods, look like they may not have even adhered to the 
doctrine of internal relations or accepted the existence of internal relations, and that, cou-
pled with the decisive argumentation of Russell and Moore, might be incentive enough to 
retire this whole messy business about internal and external relations to the ancient his-
tory of misbegotten ideas.  
 That, I think, would be unfortunate. One of the most appealing characteristics of mo-
nism is its view of the world, or of Nature, as a rationally organized system, a complex 
totality of entities standing in exclusive and inflexible relations. Russell seems to have 
had little sympathy for such a world-view, and empiricist philosophers tend to think of 
Nature, or at least of natural science, as much less cohesive and unified than it might 
seem. But I have little doubt that cosmologists are thinking along these lines when they 
speak of ‘the universe,’ and that physicists pursue, at least ideally, a theory which covers 
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everything from the smallest fundamental particles to the largest galaxies. More signifi-
cantly, because we have granted Moore the point that it is unlikely that every relation is 
necessary to its relata, and consequently that the relational properties of an entity do not 
generally ‘follow from’ the set of necessary non-relational properties thereof, we might 
want to wonder how far natural science would get if, in the course of investigating the 
relations of entities, it sought out only necessary relations. Even if natural science inves-
tigates only the ‘natures’ of entities in the modal sense, such entities will not necessarily 
stand in relations ‘in virtue of their natures’ (if we take Moore’s point), which indicates 
that a good many of the relations between them will be contingent relations.  
 And yet, Nature seems to arrange its entities in tight structures which do not break up 
and rearrange at random. Aren’t contingent relations too casual and flexible to tell natural 
scientists much about the organization of Nature? Even worse, where necessary relations 
at least tell us something informative and ampliative with respect to the ‘natures’ of enti-
ties, contingent relations are irrelevant to modal identity. This is where we might want to 
agree with Russell, that an internal relation is not always a necessary relation, and that an 
external relation is not always a contingent relation. Russell, indeed, has already given us 
an example of a necessary external relation: the less-than relation < on the natural num-
bers. If we can find an example of a contingent internal relation, then we might have 
found a relation which tells us something informative and ampliative about the ‘nature’ 
of an entity, but which is not a relation in which that entity stands in every possible world 
in which it exists. Such a relation would be exclusive and inflexible, thus not nearly as 
casual and flexible as a contingent external relation, and as such would be able to figure 
in scientific investigations into the rational organization of Nature. In that case, the modal 
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identity of an entity would not be the only relevant benchmark for understanding the ‘na-
ture’ of an entity, at least where natural science is concerned.  
 But Russell did not provide anything as precise as Moore’s definitions; and when 
updated with a ‘possible worlds’ interpretation, Moore’s modal method is much more 
conducive to reasoning about internal and external relations than Russell’s method of 
propositional analysis, even if Moore’s definitions do not help us make sense of the mo-
nist world-view. It would be difficult to come up with an example of a contingent internal 
relation so long as we do not have a working definition of ‘internal relation’ at our dis-
posal, so I propose employing an updated Moore-style modal method to give definitions 
of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ which account for Russell’s examples. Here is my proposal: a 
relation R is internal to an element xi of an n-tuple <x1,….xn> ∈ R (1 ≤ i ≤ n) if and only 
if, for every possible world in which <x1,….xn> ∈ R, there is no <y1,….yn> ∈ R such that 
yi = xi and yj ≠ xj for every j ≠ i (1 ≤ j ≤ n). And a relation R is external to an element xi of 
an n-tuple <x1,….xn> ∈ R (1 ≤ i ≤ n) if and only if it is not internal to xi. Informally, in the 
case of a binary relation R(a, b), R is internal to a if and only if, for every possible world 
in which a stands in R to b, a does not stand in R to anything except for b. R(a, b) is ex-
ternal to a if and only if there are possible worlds in which a stands in R to b and a stands 
in R to something other than b. 
 These definitions insure that, whenever a stands in an internal relation R to b, it 
stands in R exclusively and inflexibly to b. But it is not thereby necessary that a stands in 
R to b in every possible world in which a exists, nor that it stands in R to anything in 
every such possible world. E.g., the relation expressed by ‘I was born in the United 
States’ is internal to me, because in every possible world in which I was born in the 
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United States, I was not born in any other country. (It is not, however, internal to the 
United States, inasmuch as there are many possible worlds in which I am born in the 
United States along with many others.) Of course, my mother might have gone into labor 
during a vacation in Mexico, or I might never have been born at all, so there is nothing 
necessary about my standing in this relation to the United States; but it is nonetheless in-
formative and ampliative with respect to my ‘nature,’ broadly construed, since I am an 
American, and that is not a trivial or insignificant relational property. According to this 
definition of ‘internal,’ there are contingent internal relations, and they are informative 
and ampliative, as well as exclusive and inflexible.    
 According to the above definition of ‘external,’ the less-than relation < is, in addition 
to being a necessary relation between any natural numbers, external to each natural num-
ber. E.g., 7 < 9 is necessary to <7, 9>, in that 7 stands in the less-than relation < to 9 in 
every possible world in which 7 and 9 exist, and 7 < 9 is external to 7, in that 7 stands in 
< to infinitely many other numbers in every possible world in which it stands in < to 9. 
Interestingly, the successor function S on the natural numbers is, in addition to being nec-
essary to any pair which stands in it, internal to each natural number, because, e.g., 1 is 
the successor of 0 in every possible world in which 1 and 0 exist, and in every possible 
world in which 1 is the successor of 0, 1 is not the successor of any other number. This 
means, perhaps to Russell’s dismay, that not every asymmetrical relation comes out ex-
ternal according to this definition, since S is asymmetrical, e.g., 0 is not the successor of 
1. But at least S is not an ordering relation, since it does not obey the transitivity or 
trichotomy properties, so we might content ourselves by saying that, so long as ordering 
relations all come out external on this definition, Russell wouldn’t be too upset about cer-
	 45	
tain asymmetrical relations coming out internal. I have not done an exhaustive search for 
examples of internal ordering relations, but these working definitions are merely propos-
als, meant primarily to locate and sort examples, and could certainly be improved upon.76    
 To return to the case of natural science, if contingent internal relations fill the role 
they need to, in that they are informative and ampliative with respect to the ‘natures’ of 
entities, as well as exclusive and inflexible enough to tell us something about how these 
entities fit into the well-organized system of Nature, then we should be able to find ex-
amples in the natural sciences of contingent internal relations. One example might be the 
β decay of a free neutron, whereby the neutron, which becomes unstable outside the nu-
cleus, decays into the triple {proton, electron, anti-neutrino}. There is no means of con-
firming, as there is in the case of mathematical relations, that this is a contingent internal 
relation. But it seems at least plausible that there are possible worlds in which the neutron 
decays into some other set of particles, or perhaps that there are possible worlds in which 
the neutron is stable outside the nucleus and does not decay at all. However, there does 
not seem to be any possible world so casually and flexibly arranged that the neutron 
could decay sometimes into this set of particles, and sometimes into some other set of 
particles. Or, at least, if the neutron could, in some possible world, decay into any number 
of sets of particles, that would indicate that statements about the β decay of the free neu-
tron are neither informative nor ampliative with respect to its ‘nature.’ Contingent exter-
nal relations are unlikely to tell us anything about the ‘natures’ of the relata which stand 
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definition. E.g., if I am swimming in Lake Taghkanic at time t, then in every possible 
world in which I am swimming in Lake Taghkanic at t, I am not swimming in any other 
body of water at t. I am not sure what to say about this, except that it seems like yet an-
other instance of the inconsiderate interference of time with logic.   
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in them, since they tend to have the character of brute facts. But if the natural sciences are 
replete with statements about contingent internal relations, then the world-view most ap-
propriate to it would be one for which Nature could have been otherwise, but insofar as it 
is how it is, its most fundamental entities stand in relations to each other exclusively and 
inflexibly, and thereby does Nature maintain its regular and predictable course of events.  
 Would Russell recognize these as ‘internal relations’? Internal relations, by his 
lights, are supposed to be reducible to non-relational monadic properties of relata. But 
this confers a ‘corresponding complexity’ on the relata in the form of tacitly non-
monadic properties which undermine the reducibility of the relation. If an entity fits into 
the system of the universe, it stands in some relation or other to every other entity in the 
universe, thus rendering it infinitely complex. But the above definition of ‘internal’ is un-
disturbed by any of these difficulties: it does not require the reducibility of internal rela-
tions to non-relational monadic properties of relata, and thus it does not ‘imply complex-
ity’ in the relatum to which the relation is internal. And even if it did, the definition of 
‘internal’ precludes the possibility that a relatum standing in an internal relation could 
stand therein to infinitely many other entities––to stand in an internal relation is to stand 
in that relation to a restricted range of entities. If these entities were to confer complexity 
upon the relatum, it would thereby at most assume a finite complexity, and if this took 
the form of tacitly non-monadic properties, these would not threaten the reducibility of 
the internal relation to monadic properties, because no such reduction is required by the 
definition.  
 So in what sense is it a definition of ‘internal’? Why not call these relations some-
thing else, like ‘exclusive’ or ‘committed’ relations, and oppose them to ‘open’ or ‘cas-
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ual’ relations (to use a romantic metaphor)? I call these relations ‘internal’ because their 
definitions are designed to avoid the difficulties Russell describes, by i). conceding the 
irreducible existence of relations, and ii). letting only those entities which stand in exter-
nal relations relate to infinitely many other entities, so that even if complexity is con-
ferred by internal relations, it is not infinite complexity, and Nature does not impute its 
total system of relations to each entity which stands in an internal relation. I call them 
‘internal’ also because they are designed to occupy a role in the natural sciences in which 
they are informative and ampliative with respect to the ‘natures’ of entities, as well as 
exclusive and inflexible enough to embody the tight arrangements of Nature, a role which 
I associate with a monist world-view. Though Russell and Moore may have discredited 
the doctrine of internal relations, they have not, and arguably did not intend to, establish 
that all relations are external. This leaves room for a viable definition of ‘internal rela-
tion’ to redeem what is redeemable in metaphysical monism.  
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